BOLD responses in reward regions to hypothetical and imaginary monetary rewards by Miyapuram, Krishna P et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2012
BOLD responses in reward regions to hypothetical and imaginary monetary
rewards
Miyapuram, Krishna P; Tobler, Philippe N; Gregorios-Pippas, Lucy; Schultz, Wolfram
Abstract: Monetary rewards are uniquely human. Because money is easy to quantify and present visually,
it is the reward of choice for most fMRI studies, even though it cannot be handed over to participants
inside the scanner. A typical fMRI study requires hundreds of trials and thus small amounts of monetary
rewards per trial (e.g. 5p) if all trials are to be treated equally. However, small payoffs can have
detrimental effects on performance due to their limited buying power. Hypothetical monetary rewards
can overcome the limitations of smaller monetary rewards but it is less well known whether predictors
of hypothetical rewards activate reward regions. In two experiments, visual stimuli were associated with
hypothetical monetary rewards. In Experiment 1, we used stimuli predicting either visually presented
or imagined hypothetical monetary rewards, together with non-rewarding control pictures. Activations
to reward predictive stimuli occurred in reward regions, namely the medial orbitofrontal cortex and
midbrain. In Experiment 2, we parametrically varied the amount of visually presented hypothetical
monetary reward keeping constant the amount of actually received reward. Graded activation in midbrain
was observed to stimuli predicting increasing hypothetical rewards. The results demonstrate the efficacy
of using hypothetical monetary rewards in fMRI studies.
DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.09.029
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-61454
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Miyapuram, Krishna P; Tobler, Philippe N; Gregorios-Pippas, Lucy; Schultz, Wolfram (2012). BOLD
responses in reward regions to hypothetical and imaginary monetary rewards. NeuroImage, 59(2):1692-
1699. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.09.029
 1 
 
BOLD responses in reward regions to hypothetical and 
imaginary monetary rewards 
 
Krishna P. Miyapuram1*, Philippe N. Tobler2#, Lucy Gregorios-Pippas1, Wolfram 
Schultz1 
1 Department of Physiology, Development and Neuroscience, 
University of Cambridge, Downing Site, Cambridge, CB23DY, UK 
2 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, 
Oxford, UK 
 
Running Title: BOLD responses to hypothetical rewards 
 
 
*Corresponding Author: 
Krishna P. Miyapuram 
Present address: Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Italy 
krishna.miyapuram@cantab.net 
Tel : +91 9908 225 751 
 
#Present address: Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, Department of Economics, 
University of Zurich, Switzerland. 
 
Keywords: Reward, hypothetical reward, money, fMRI, dopaminergic, midbrain, substantia nigra, ventral 
tegmental area, classical conditioning, Pavlovian conditioning, reward imagination, mental imagery, 
evaluative conditioning, Neuroeconomics 
 
Acknowledgments: This research was funded by the Wellcome Trust and the MRC-
Wellcome Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute (BCNI). KPM was supported 
by the Cambridge Nehru Scholarship and Overseas Research Students Award Scheme, 
UK, PNT by a Royal Society University Research Fellowship and the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (PP00P1_128574). 
  
Abstract 
Monetary rewards are uniquely human. Because money is easy to quantify and present 
visually, it is the reward of choice for most fMRI studies, even though it cannot be 
handed over to participants inside the scanner. A typical fMRI study requires hundreds of 
trials and thus small amounts of monetary rewards per trial (e.g. 5p) if all trials are to be 
treated equally. However, small payoffs can have detrimental effects on performance due 
to their limited buying power. Hypothetical monetary rewards can overcome the 
limitations of smaller monetary rewards but it is less well known whether predictors of 
hypothetical rewards activate reward regions. In two experiments, visual stimuli were 
associated with hypothetical monetary rewards. In experiment 1, we used stimuli 
predicting either visually presented or imagined hypothetical monetary rewards, together 
with non-rewarding control pictures. Activations to reward predictive stimuli occurred in 
reward regions, namely the medial orbitofrontal cortex and midbrain. In experiment 2, we 
parametrically varied the amount of visually presented hypothetical monetary reward 
keeping constant the amount of actually received reward. Graded activation in midbrain 
was observed to stimuli predicting increasing hypothetical rewards. The results 
demonstrate the efficacy of using hypothetical monetary rewards in fMRI studies.  
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Money is a strong motivator. Subjects work harder, more persistently, and more 
effectively, if they earn more money for better performance (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). 
Typical fMRI studies involve hundreds of trials with each trial lasting around 10 seconds. 
If one wants to treat each trial equally and incentive-compatible, then monetary rewards 
paid to the participants per trial need to be small to avoid excessive expenditure for the 
experimenter. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that while larger amounts of money 
yielded higher performance (in terms of parents complying with day care rules), smaller 
amounts yielded poorer performance than no compensation at all. Hence, monetary 
incentives at low value can have a detrimental effect on performance. Hypothetical 
payoffs provide one possibility to overcome the limitation of small gambles in 
experimental situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 
Hypothetical rewards have been investigated in behavioural studies using paradigms such 
as the Iowa gambling task (Bowman & Turnbull, 2003; Fernie & Turney, 2006) and 
temporal discounting tasks (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Lagorio & Madden, 2005). These 
previous studies suggest that hypothetical rewards can motivate behaviour to a similar 
degree as actual rewards (but see Holt & Laury, 2002). In a neuroimaging study, Wittman 
et al. (2007) investigated temporal discounting using hypothetical rewards in the range of 
few hundred dollars with delays ranging from 5 days to 10 years. However, hypothetical 
rewards have also been used for much shorter delays (e.g. in Gregorios-Pippas et al., 
2009, where participants received a percentage of displayed reward every trial). Neural 
findings from these earlier studies using hypothetical rewards were in line with other 
imaging studies of temporal discounting using potentially real rewards (e.g. McClure et 
al., 2004, where one of the participant’s choices was selected randomly). In agreement 
with this notion, Bickel et al. (2009) found no difference in behavioural and neural 
activation when comparing real and hypothetical monetary gains and fictive monetary 
losses in a temporal discounting task. Thus, at least in situations involving future 
  
outcomes, hypothetical monetary rewards seem to be able to influence behaviour and 
neural activity similar to real payoffs.  
 
Monetary rewards are secondary reinforcers that possibly acquired their value by 
association with more primary rewards. It is therefore conceivable that monetary rewards 
act through imagination of rewarding objects that can be acquired through them. Indeed 
in a recent reward imagination study by Bray et al. (2010), participants who imagined 
monetary or other types of secondary rewards activated primary reward regions. 
However, monetary rewards have become so ubiquitous in our daily life that they can be 
considered as rewards in their own right. Functional neuroimaging studies using 
monetary rewards have found the same brain regions as those involved in processing 
primary rewards also without asking participants to imagine (e.g. Valentin & O’Doherty, 
2009; Tobler et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2011). Given that money is easier to present than 
primary rewards, it is no surprise that monetary rewards have become the choice of most 
neuroimaging studies of reward processing. We set out to investigate motivational 
aspects and corresponding neural activity using various different ways of presenting 
hypothetical monetary rewards.  
 
Human neuroimaging studies using blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have identified a set of reward regions in the 
midbrain, striatum and orbitofrontal cortex, consistent with findings from non-human 
primates (for review see Haber & Knutson, 2010).  Moreover, conditioned stimuli 
predicting real monetary rewards activate reward regions in humans (e.g. Tobler et al., 
2007). Here, we set out to investigate whether also predictors of hypothetical monetary 
rewards would activate reward regions of the brain. In order to investigate motivational 
aspects of monetary rewards, we presented participants with hypothetical rewards that 
displayed a larger value, but told them that they would be able to take home only a 
specific percentage of the displayed money. Some previous studies (e.g. Dreher et al., 
2006; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009) have used a similar 
strategy but not explicitly studied the effects of hypothetical rewards.  Accordingly, we 
  
performed two experiments using different scenarios – when the hypothetical rewards are 
visually presented or imagined (experiment 1) and when the real pay-off is explicitly 
displayed (experiment 2) or invisible (experiment 1). Further we hypothesized that 
increasing the hypothetical monetary reward would result in increased activation in 
reward regions although the real pay-off is kept constant (experiment 2).  
 
Materials and Methods  
Subjects 
A total of 17 right handed participants (mean age 25.5 years, range 21.6 - 30.5 years) 
were recruited from among undergraduate and graduate student populations in the 
Cambridge area of the UK. Ten participants took part in both the experiments (the first 
experiment was always performed at the end of the session).  The data from two 
participants could not be recovered due to technical reasons. The data from three 
participants, from each of the two experiments, were excluded from all analyses due to 
large head movements detected in the realignment process. The final data analysis was 
performed on 12 participants each in the first (5 female) and second (6 female) 
experiments. Participants were pre-assessed through self-report to exclude prior histories 
of neurological or psychiatric illness (including depression and schizophrenia), and drug 
usage. Participants were asked to refrain from excessive alcohol usage on the night before 
scanning. All participants gave informed written consent and were paid for participation. 
The research protocol was approved by the Cambridgeshire Local Research Ethics 
Committee, U.K. 
 
Stimuli, training and pleasantness ratings 
Scanning only took place after participants had learned the meaning of abstract visual 
stimuli in a training session (see below). Experiment 1 used a 2x2 factorial design in 
which four abstract stimuli were paired with visually presented or imagined hypothetical 
monetary reward or a control picture. During the imagination trials, a blank screen was 
displayed following the offset of the abstract stimulus. Experiment 2 used a 2x3 factorial 
  
design in which six abstract stimuli were paired with pictorial or alphanumerical display 
of parametrically increasing hypothetical monetary rewards with three different 
magnitudes. The hypothetical monetary rewards were always accompanied by a fixed 
real-payoff (5 pence) that was invisible (experiment 1) or explicitly displayed 
(experiment 2).  The stimulus-reward associations were randomized across subjects for 
both experiments. The presentation of the stimuli and recording of responses was 
controlled by Cogent 2000 software on Matlab. 
 
For both experiments 1 and 2, we trained subjects up to a week before the scanning 
session to learn the correct stimulus-reward contingencies (Figure 1a). Stimulus 
pleasantness ratings for the abstract stimuli were collected from the subjects before and 
after training and scanning sessions (Figure 1a). The abstract stimuli were rated on a 
scale of 1 (dislike very much) to 5 (like very much). The value of 3 was marked as 
indifferent on the pleasantness rating scale. After baseline pleasantness ratings were 
collected, participants received a customized instruction sheet, showing the exact 
stimulus-reward contingencies. After reading the instructions, participants returned the 
instruction sheet to the experimenter. The training session proceeded with identical trial 
structure (see descriptions below) as the scanning session except that the number of 
repetitions for each trial type in the training session was half (experiment 1: 15, 
experiment 2: 20) of those in the scanning session. 
 
 
Experiment 1 
In experiment 1 (Figure 1b), four visual (fractal) stimuli predicted either visual 
presentation or imagination of a money bill (reward) or a scrambled picture (no reward). 
The rewarding picture was a hypothetical monetary reward (£20 money bill) together 
with an invisible real payoff (5 pence) that was added to the cumulative sum to take home 
at the end of the experiment. The non-rewarding picture was a scrambled picture of a £20 
money bill that did not contribute towards cumulative earnings. The scrambled picture 
was smoothed to avoid any overt association with the £20 money bill or reconstruction of 
  
the money bill from its parts. The visual presentation and imagination trials differed in 
that the money bill (hypothetical reward) and the scrambled picture were displayed on the 
screen or not, respectively.  
 
Each trial started with a central fixation ‘+’ symbol at the centre of the screen, presented 
during a truncated Poisson distributed random interval (mean 4 sec; maximum duration 6 
sec).  Then, one of the four visual stimuli appeared for 2 sec. The offset of the visual 
stimulus marked the onset of a 1 sec presentation of the rewarding picture (£20 money 
bill) or the scrambled picture for visual presentation trials or of a blank screen for 
imagination trials. At the end of every trial, one of the two questions “what did you see” 
or “what did you imagine” appeared on the screen. Below the question, three answer 
choices (money bill; scrambled picture; nothing) were indicated. Participants responded 
by pressing one of three corresponding buttons. The spatial position of the three answer 
choices on the screen was randomized across trials to avoid preparation of specific 
movements during stimulus presentation. Including the option of having seen or imagined 
“nothing” allowed us to get reliable self-report from the participants. If the participant did 
not respond within 1.5 sec, a red square was flashed for 0.5 sec and the trial was repeated. 
Cumulative earnings were not displayed to prevent explicit pairing of the visual stimuli 
with the visual receipt of the reward in the imagination trials. Unbeknownst to the 
participants, a total of 30 repetitions for each trial type were required to complete the 
scanning session.  
 
In this experiment, we particularly ensured that participants successfully understand the 
meaning of stimuli that predicted imagination of the money bill or the scrambled picture 
by the customized instruction sheet. No further explicit instructions were given during the 
experiment regarding imagination. Hence, participants never experienced a visible 
(hypothetical or real) reward in the imagination trials in either the training or scanning 
sessions. We adopted this strategy so that the training and scanning sessions were 
identical. Learning was ensured by including a question at the end of every trial (as 
indicated above).  
  
 
Experiment 2   
Experiment 2 investigated effects of parametrically increasing hypothetical rewards 
without increasing the actual pay-off (Figure 1c). Six abstract stimuli were associated 
with three values of alphanumeric or pictorial displayed money – 10 pence, 1 Pound and 
10 Pounds, all predicting the same amount of real money (5 pence).  Participants were 
informed before the experiment that all displayed money was hypothetical whereas actual 
cumulative earnings were displayed at the bottom of the screen throughout the 
experiment. To control for visual saliency, we presented both pictures of real money and 
alphanumeric representations of the three values. Monetary rewards were visually 
presented at a uniform size of 240x120 pixels.   
 
 Each trial started with a central fixation ‘+’ symbol at the centre of the screen, presented 
during a random interval that followed a truncated Poisson distribution (mean 5 sec; 
maximum duration 8 sec). This interval served to separate the present from the previous 
trial. Then, one of the six visual stimuli (dimensions 100x100 pixels) appeared for 2 sec 
at a random location either on the top-half or on the bottom-half of the screen. A 
conditional motor task was overlaid onto the Pavlovian paradigm to keep participants 
attentive throughout the experiment.  Participants responded by pressing either the left or 
right button (using a mouse in training sessions and an MRI compatible button box in 
scanning sessions) with their index and middle fingers, respectively, to indicate where on 
the screen the stimulus had appeared. The allocation of top half-to-left button vs. top half-
to-right button was randomized across participants.  After a correct response, the 
monetary reward was visually presented for 1 sec replacing the abstract stimulus on the 
screen. Upon error, a red square was shown at the centre of the screen and the trial was 
repeated. The cumulative sum of actual money received was displayed throughout at the 
bottom of the screen, and was updated at the time of displaying the monetary reward. A 
total of 40 repetitions for each trial type were required to complete two scanning runs. 
The counter of cumulative earnings was reset in-between two scanning runs.  
 
  
To ensure learning of stimulus-reward contingencies, participants were tested on a 
modified version of the task immediately after the training session. The testing task 
consisted of displaying one abstract stimulus at a time at the centre top half of the screen 
and the six sets of monetary rewards in two rows at the bottom of the screen. Subjects 
indicated the monetary reward associated with the abstract stimulus displayed by pressing 
the appropriate key on a keypad.  
 
Data Acquisition and Analysis  
This section describes imaging data acquisition and analysis for both experiments. 
Functional imaging was performed on a MedSpec (Bruker, Ettlingen, Germany) scanner 
at 3 Tesla. Two whole brain acquisitions weighted by Gradient Echo and Spin Echo were 
obtained within a scan repetition time (TR) of 2.4 sec. 21 horizontal slices with in-plane 
resolution of 3.75mm x 3.75mm, were collected with a slice thickness of 5 mm and slice 
gap of 1 mm. We used Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM2) software from the 
Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London within Matlab 6.5 (The 
Mathworks Inc., MA) for data analysis. The first five volumes of each series were 
discarded to avoid T1 saturation effects. Results from the Gradient Echo acquisition are 
reported as no additional activation was observed with the Spin Echo acquisition.  
Data Analysis: 
Images were slice-time corrected and realigned to correct for any head movements.  The 
realigned images were normalized to a standard brain EPI template in MNI (Montreal 
Neurological Institute) space (Friston et al., 1995a) and resampled to a voxel size of 
2x2x2 mm. An isotropic Gaussian filter with 8 mm full width at half maximum was used 
to spatially smooth the normalized images. Serial autocorrelations within the functional 
data were estimated using a first order auto-regressive model (AR-1). Statistical analysis 
was performed using a general linear model (Friston et al., 1995b). The data were high-
pass filtered at a frequency of 1/128 Hz. Given that the stimulus-outcome associations 
had already been learnt during the training session by our participants, activations were 
assessed at the onset of the abstract visual stimuli predicting reward or no reward 
  
(experiment 1) or hypothetical rewards of different magnitudes (experiment 2). Stick 
functions at the onset of the visual stimuli were convolved with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function (HRF) and its time and dispersion derivatives. Group 
analysis was performed with random effects models (Penny et al., 2003) and correction 
for non-sphericity of the data.  
 
Thresholding strategy 
Based on previous neurophysiological and human neuroimaging studies of reward and 
novelty, we defined three regions of interest (ROIs) in the midbrain (Schultz, 1998; 
Elliott et al., 2003; O’Doherty et. al., 2006; Bunzeck & Düzel, 2006; Tobler et al., 2007), 
ventral striatum (Knutson et al., 2001; O’Doherty et. al., 2006; Burke et al., 2010) and 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Bray et al., 2010; Sescousse et al., 
2010) in agreement with their known role in reward processing.  All ROIs were 
anatomically defined using the WFU Pick Atlas toolbox (Lancaster et al., 2000; Maldjian 
et al., 2003). The ROI for the midbrain consisted of bilateral substantial nigra extended 
by 2 mm to include the medially adjoining ventral tegmental area (VTA). Given the 
similarity of neurophysiological responses of dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental 
area and the substantia nigra pars compacta (Schultz, 1998), we did not focus on either of 
these structures (D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Düzel et al., 2009). The ROI for ventral striatum 
was anatomically defined consisting of caudate and putamen confined to brain slices z < 
0 mm and extended by 2 mm to include the medially adjoining nucleus accumbens. The 
ROI for medial OFC was anatomically defined. Reported activations are corrected for 
multiple comparisons (p<0.05, family-wise error) for height of activation within the 
volume of our ROI. For visualization of the extent of activations in our ROIs (in figures 
and activation table), we use an exploratory threshold of p<0.005 uncorrected with a 
minimum extent of 10 voxels.  
Behavioural Results 
Pleasantness ratings of abstract stimuli did not differ before training (experiment 1: 
F(3,33)=0.49, p=0.69; experiment 2: F(5,66)=0.59, p=0.7). Participants successfully 
  
learned the stimulus-reward associations by the end of the training session for both 
experiments (Figure 2). 
  
In experiment 1, the stimuli predicting reward were rated as more pleasant than the 
control stimuli predicting no reward (visual presentation: p<0.005, imagination: p<0.05). 
In experiment 2, stimuli associated with 10 pounds were rated as more pleasant than 
stimuli associated with 10 pence (alphanumeric: p<0.05, pictorial: p<0.05). Learning, as 
indexed by change in pleasantness ratings, was significant during the training session 
(experiment 1: p<0.05, experiment 2: p<0.05). No further learning took place during the 
scanning session (first experiment: p=0.07, second experiment: p=0.12).  These results 
suggest that the stimulus-reward associations were successfully established during the 
training session, which took place up to a week before the scanning session. 
 
In experiment 1, all participants correctly reported the contents of visual presentation and 
imagination (money bill or scrambled picture) at the end of every trial in more than 94% 
of trials (average 96.8%±1%) in the scanning session. In experiment 2, participants 
correctly identified stimulus-reward associations (accuracy ranging between 83.6±7% 
and 93.3±3.5%) during the testing session immediately after the training session. These 
results indicate the correct identification of stimulus-reward associations. 
 
Brain Imaging 
Activation to hypothetical and invisible rewards 
The main effect of brain activation to hypothetical rewards is identified from experiment 
1 by contrasting stimuli predicting reward with stimuli predicting no reward. The reward 
in this comparison consisted of visually presented or imagined hypothetical monetary 
reward (20 pounds money bill) together with an invisible real pay-off (5 pence). We 
found a main effect for reward-related activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
and the midbrain (Figure 3, Table 1). Activation in the ventral striatum did not survive 
small volume correction but was present at a lower threshold (Figure 3, Table 1). When 
  
tested individually, reward-related activation was observed in the medial OFC and the 
midbrain in visual presentation and imagination trials, respectively (Figure 4, Table 1). 
However, direct comparison of visual presentation and imagination trials did not reveal 
differential activations in any of the ROIs even at the exploratory threshold (p<0.005, 
k=10 voxels). At this exploratory threshold, we found overlapping, common activation in 
the midbrain (p = 0.07, small volume corrected) in the imagination and visual 
presentation trials using conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005). These results indicate 
that hypothetical monetary rewards (irrespective of whether they are visually presented or 
imagined) enter associations with predictive stimuli and thereby activate reward regions 
even though the real pay-off is small.  
 
Graded activation to hypothetical rewards. 
The second experiment investigated the effect of parametrically increasing the value of 
the visually presented hypothetical reward (10 pence, 1 pound, 10 pounds) without 
increasing the real pay-off (5 pence). Two modes of hypothetical rewards were used - 
pictures of real money or alphanumeric displays of the corresponding value. By 
displaying the real cumulative take-home amount of money, we ensured that the brain 
responses reflect the effect of increasing the hypothetical monetary rewards. A linear 
contrast compared the stimuli predicting 10 pounds to stimuli predicting 10 pence. The 
contrast weight for reward display of 1 pound was set to zero, thus served as a middle 
point. Graded activation in the midbrain was observed with this contrast irrespective of 
whether the hypothetical rewards were alphanumeric or pictorial (Figure 5, Table 1). We 
did not find activations in other ROIs even at the exploratory threshold. The opposite 
contrast comparing 10 pence > 10 pounds with 1 pound as middle point did not yield any 
activations in our ROIs even at an exploratory threshold. We also tested an ROI in the 
striatum that included the dorsal striatum and did not find any activation for the contrast 
of interest. These results indicate that the midbrain activation reflects increasing 
magnitude of hypothetical monetary rewards although the real pay-off is kept constant.  
  
 
Discussion 
This research investigated brain activations to hypothetical monetary rewards that 
displayed an increased value of monetary rewards without in fact increasing the actual 
reward paid to the subject. The results show  activations in the medial orbitofrontal cortex 
and the midbrain in processing visually presented and imagined hypothetical monetary 
rewards. Further, midbrain activation increased in a graded fashion with increasing 
amounts of hypothetical monetary rewards. Our results suggest that the use of 
hypothetical monetary rewards could be adopted as a generic technique for performing 
neuroimaging studies on reward. 
 
Monetary rewards in neuroimaging studies 
Functional neuroimaging studies using monetary rewards have found the same brain 
regions as those involved in processing primary rewards (e.g. Valentin & O’Doherty, 
2009; Tobler et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2011). These and other previous studies have used 
varied experimental procedures to determine the way subjects receive monetary rewards. 
For instance, a consolidated amount is paid for participation and the reward is not 
contingent on the subject’s performance (e.g. Boettiger et al., 2007; Schonberg et al., 
2010). Another approach would be to use both monetary gains and losses (e.g. Delgado et 
al., 2005; Kim et al., 2006) so that the total money payable to subjects at the end of the 
experiment is not very large. Subjects might prefer (infrequent) large rewards compared 
to cumulative (frequent) small rewards. Hence, some paradigms use probabilistic rewards 
or randomly pick one of the decisions made about large rewards by the subject (e.g. Hsu 
et al., 2005; Pine et al., 2009).  
 
Hypothetical monetary rewards (see also Bickel et al., 2009; Dreher et al., 2006; Kuhnen 
& Knutson, 2005) offer a good alternative to these methods of payment to subjects, as it 
offers stringent control to experimenters without having to resort to deceiving subjects, 
using probabilistic outcomes or losses, or treating trials differently. An unavoidable 
limitation of the approach used in our experiments is that the magnitude of the displayed 
  
reward covaried with the hypothetical monetary reward. To account for this, participants 
were explicitly informed about the actual reward they would receive in each trial. Using 
hypothetical rewards also overcomes the issue that the real value of monetary rewards 
given every trial (e.g. 5p) has to be very small. It brings together psychological theories 
that postulate a positive reinforcement such as an OK signal is sufficient to drive 
behaviour, and economic theories that suggest monetary reward is crucial to positively 
drive behaviour (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), as long as the monetary reward is not too 
small (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). As an extension of our approach, it would be 
interesting to compare the receipt of positive reinforcement signals and other forms of 
hypothetical rewards such as  receiving ‘points’.  
 
Reward regions activated by hypothetical monetary rewards 
Experiment 2 revealed graded activations in the midbrain to stimuli predicting different 
reward denominations (Figure 5, Table 1). The design of this study allowed us to 
dissociate the visual aspects of the monetary rewards from the value attached to them by 
using both alphanumeric and pictorial representations. The activation observed in the 
midbrain occurred in a region that also responds to primary liquid and food reward 
(Schultz, 1998).  Similar activations occur in midbrain neurons of humans with monetary 
rewards (Zaghloul et al., 2009).   
 
The graded activations in midbrain to increasing hypothetical rewards occurred despite 
the fact that each trial resulted in the same real pay-out.  One possibility to account for 
this finding is that the reinforcing properties of money are so strong that when tested 
under extinction (such as delivering 5 pence when displaying 5 pounds, thus artificially 
decreasing the value of displayed reward), the responses do not extinguish. In other 
words, the graded responses comply with the displayed reward magnitude, instead of 
diminished responses to the extinction procedure. Such resistance to extinction would be 
reminiscent of the effects of drugs of abuse on instrumental behaviour (e.g. Quick & 
Shahan, 2009). 
 
  
Experiment 1 revealed activation in medial OFC to visually presented hypothetical 
monetary rewards (Figure 4, Table 1). Previous neuroimaging studies have found a role 
for OFC in outcome valuation (Elliott et al., 2008; Chib et al., 2009; Peters & Büchel, 
2009, 2010; Sescousse et al., 2010) and a medio-lateral distinction in processing 
rewarding and aversive stimuli (Elliott et al., 2000; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Kringelbach 
& Rolls, 2004). The activation in the medial OFC to stimuli predicting visually presented 
rewards is consistent with these earlier findings. However, at the employed statistical 
thresholds we did not find activations in the medial OFC ROI to increasing hypothetical 
reward. The outcomes in terms of real pay-off were the same irrespective of the displayed 
reward. Hence, it could be the case that the medial OFC is not differentially engaged 
when the actual outcomes do not differ.  
 
In our two experiments, we did not observe reliable activations in the ventral striatum at 
the employed thresholds. Experiment 1 revealed a main effect for reward in the ventral 
striatum at an exploratory threshold (Figure 3, Table 1). At this threshold, activation in 
ventral striatum was observed in visual presentation trials (Table 1). In experiment 2, we 
did not find increasing activation in ventral striatum with increasing hypothetical 
rewards. Earlier neuroimaging studies have implicated the ventral striatum in 
representing reward value (Knutson et al., 2001; Peters & Büchel, 2009, 2010) and in 
reward prediction error (Pagnoni et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2006; 
Hare et al., 2008). In a temporal discounting paradigm with similar hypothetical 
monetary rewards as in our experiments, ventral striatum activation showed differential 
discounting depending on the magnitude of the reward (Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2010). 
The real pay-offs in Gregorios-Pippas et al. (2010) were proportional to the displayed 
reward, whereas in our experiment, the real pay-off was constant irrespective of the 
displayed reward.   Hence, it could be the case that, similar to medial OFC, the ventral 
striatum is not differentially engaged when the actual outcomes do not differ. 
 
Together, the absence of graded responses in medial OFC and ventral striatum (see Peters 
& Büchel, 2010) suggests that hypothetical rewards could be less efficient in eliciting 
  
increasing activations with increasing reward magnitude. A direct comparison of neural 
responses between increasing monetary reward and increasing hypothetical reward would 
be an interesting extension of our study.  
 
Imagination of hypothetical monetary rewards 
A novel contribution from our study is the investigation of experienced and imagined 
rewards. We found activation in medial OFC and midbrain to stimuli predicting visually 
presented and imagined rewards, respectively, though these activations were not 
significantly different among the two conditions (Figure 4, Table 1). Bray et al. (2010) 
found activation in medial OFC when participants imagined items they found personally 
rewarding. In the present study, we found reliable midbrain activation extending 
bilaterally in the imagination trials. Our findings suggest a possibility of common neural 
activation in the midbrain for imagined and (albeit slightly less strong in) visually 
presented rewards. It is of interest that no other activation was found to be common 
outside this ROI in a whole brain exploratory analysis. One reason for the discrepancy 
between our findings and those of Bray et al. (2010) could be due to the short duration of 
reward in the current study that limited the generation of vivid mental images as opposed 
to the longer duration used in the block design of Bray et al. (2010).  
 
A key limitation of our study is that we cannot dissociate common activation, if any, 
between visually presented and imagined trials to be due to the imagination of 
hypothetical reward or the common receipt of invisible reward (i.e. 5 pence).  Our 
findings also have to be interpreted in view of the limited power provided by the 
relatively small number of participants (n=12). Including more participants should be a 
consideration for future studies according to current practices in neuroimaging. Further, 
the image acquisition was done at a lower spatial resolution of 3.75 x 3.75 x 5 mm3. 
Higher resolution of functional imaging would be desirable when focusing of regions 
such as the midbrain (D’Ardenne et al., 2008).  
 
  
While our data are somewhat suggestive about common neural activations for reward-
related visual imagery and perception, Kosslyn et al. (1996) did not find common brain 
areas affected by aversive stimuli during imagery and perception in their positron 
emission tomography (PET) study.  Bray et al. (2010) have demonstrated a role for 
medial OFC in reward imagination. Contrary to those studies, we have used an event-
related design with randomized trials of reward imagery and perception. The difference 
between these diverse findings regarding common neural activity may point to subtle 
differences in the imagination of outcomes of different valence, although the differences 
could also be due to methodological differences, such as the higher temporal resolution of 
fMRI compared to PET. Further studies using both rewarding and aversive stimuli with 
the same methods in the same participants would be required to corroborate this potential 
difference.  
 
Theories of mental imagery disagree on whether the content of mental images and 
percepts are visual depictions (Kosslyn, 1988) or abstract propositions (Pylyshyn, 2002). 
We verbally instructed participants at the outset that all stimuli associated with reward 
presentation and imagination would result in the same amount of reward at the end of the 
experiment. Hence, participants may have imagined verbal rather than visual contents. To 
more fully address the mental contents of reward imagination, future research may want 
to dissociate propositional and visual reward imagination more explicitly. As a further 
extension, it would also be interesting to compare imagination of abstract reinforcers 
such as money to more primary rewards such as food reward or erotic stimuli (e.g. 
Simmons et al., 2005; Sescousse et al., 2010).  
 
In summary, we propose that despite their limitations, monetary rewards can be used to 
study the human reward system in a straightforward manner. This technique is 
particularly useful to show participants monetary rewards with some buying power so 
that reward responses are maintained and avoid disappointment or frustration induced by 
the small value of money otherwise given at single trial levels.  
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Figure 1: Experimental design and behavioural results.  
(a) Training and Scanning schedule. Participants were trained up to one week before the 
scanning session using exactly the same stimulus-reward contingencies. In the first 
experiment, the instructions to imagine were given in a customized instruction sheet 
showing the stimulus – reward contingencies for every participant. They reported after 
every trial what they had seen or imagined using a button press.  Participants performed 
an additional testing task immediately after the training of the second experiment. The 
training and scanning sessions for the two experiments were identical except that the 
training sessions had only half the number of trials. Pleasantness ratings for abstract 
stimuli were collected at the beginning and end of training and scanning sessions. The 
training and scanning sessions took place on different days separated up to one week. The 
  
first experiment was always at the end of the session for those participants who took part 
in both experiments.  
(b) Experiment 1. Four conditional stimuli were associated with either rewarding or non-
rewarding pictures visually presented on the screen or to be imagined during a blank 
screen. Participants were instructed before the start of the experiment to imagine the 
corresponding reward or non-rewarding picture when the blank screen appeared. To 
ensure minimal demand effects, an invisible actual reward was given for every rewarding 
trial. The invisible reward was by two orders of magnitude smaller than the hypothetical 
reward picture and participants were fully informed of this manipulation at the start of the 
experiment. The contents of visual presentation and imagination were recorded by self-
report on every trial.  
(c) Experiment 2. Three conditional stimuli were associated with three hypothetical 
rewards that yielded the same actual reward. Two modes of reward presentation were 
used for hypothetical rewards – alphanumeric and pictorial. The actual reward was not 
displayed to the participants but added to the total take-home sum that was continuously 
displayed at the bottom of the screen throughout the experiment.  
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Figure 2: Pleasantness ratings. (a) Pleasantness ratings for four conditional stimuli in 
experiment 1 on a scale of 1 (dislike very much) to 5 (like very much). Pretraining took 
place up to one week before the scanning session. (b) Pleasantness ratings for the six 
conditional stimuli predicting three hypothetical rewards in alphanumeric (left panel) and 
pictorial (right panel) modes of presentation.  
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Figure 3: Main effect of reward – related activation. Activation in (a) medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (b) midbrain and (c) ventral striatum for reward compared to no 
reward in experiment 1. The activation maps are thresholded at p<0.005 and an extent 
threshold of 10 voxels for display purposes. Note that activations are displayed for the 
whole brain and the anatomical ROI masks are not used in the figures. 
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Figure 4: Activation to visually presented and imagined rewards. (a, b) medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), (c-e) midbrain. Activation is shown in green for visual 
presentation condition and in red for imagination condition. See the legend of Figure 3 
for thresholding information. The corresponding contrasts of parameter estimates (betas) 
are plotted in (b) medial OFC, (d), left and (e) right midbrain.  
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Figure 5: Graded activation in the midbrain to hypothetical rewards in experiment 2 and 
the corresponding plot of parameter estimates (betas). See also the legend of Figure 3 for 
thresholding information.   
  
Table 1: Location of peak activations in regions of interest (ROIs). Extent of 
activation (cluster size) is reported at uncorrected threshold of p<0.005 and the 
number of voxels surviving small volume correction for height of activation is also 
given.  
Contrast ROI MNI coordinates (mm) Z 
score 
Cluster size 
  
x Y Z 
 
uncorrected ROI 
corrected 
Experiment 1             
Main effect: reward > no reward 
  
Medial OFC 10 46 -8 4.14 254 32 
Midbrain 12 -18 -6 3.46 56 3 
-6 -8 -12 3.13 68 0 
-8 -18 -6 3.12 
Ventral 
Striatum 6 10 -10 2.85 37 0 
Visual presentation (reward > no reward) 
  
Medial OFC 10 46 -8 4.17 246 35 
Midbrain 10 -20 -6 3.10 12 0 
Ventral 
Striatum 2 12 -12 3.44 80 0 
Imagination (reward > no reward) 
  
Midbrain -6 -10 -6 3.54 80 8 
8 -20 -6 3.46 43 1 
Conjunction: Visual presentation AND Imagination (reward > no reward) 
 
Midbrain 10 -20 -6 3.10 11 0 
Experiment 2             
Main effect: 10 pounds > 10 pence  
  
Midbrain 10 -10 -12 3.52 55 4 
Alphanumeric (10 pounds > 10 pence) 
  
Midbrain 4 -16 -8 2.92 22 0 
-4 -16 -10 2.81 19 0 
Pictorial (10 pounds > 10 pence) 
  
Midbrain 8 -26 -12 2.80 4 0 
 
 
